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Institutional corruption refers to actions that are legal yet carry negative 
consequences for the greater good. Such legal yet harmful behaviors have been 
observed among politicians and donors who establish quid-pro-quo relationships 
in exchange for money and among doctors who receive gifts from pharmaceutical 
companies in return for recommending the companies’ drugs. How does the 
general public reconcile the tension between the legal status of an action and its 
impact on the greater good and judge the action’s moral acceptability? We 
explored this question empirically by comparing the relative weight people give to 
the legal status of actions and to the impact of actions when judging moral 
acceptability. Results show that people unequivocally rely on legal status and 
ignore the impact of the actions. We conclude that people outsource their moral 
judgments to the law. The law does not simply reflect people’s sense of corruption 
but determines it. Together, our research suggests a surprising and ironic role for 
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How People Judge Institutional Corruption 
ELINOR AMIT *, EUGY HAN **, ANN-CHRISTIN POSTEN ***                                
& STEVEN SLOMAN **** 
Former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, Martin Shkreli, gained a high 
profile in 2015 when he purchased the rights to a lifesaving HIV drug, 
Daraprim, and hiked up its price by more than 5000%.1 While such acts of 
price gouging can often be observed in business, Shkreli’s act created 
controversy because Daraprim is on the World Health Organization’s List 
of Essential Medicines.2 Though Shkreli was heavily criticized, he justified 
his actions with the response: “[E]verything we’ve done is legal.”3 Shkreli 
was right. His actions, potentially ruining the lives of a large number of 
people, were legal. And he was not alone. Legal actions that result in 
terrible consequences are, in fact, quite common, from pharmaceutical 
companies partnering with doctors to prescribe their more expensive 
drugs,4 to politicians who establish quid-pro-quo relationships with donors 
who anonymously give them unlimited amounts of money,5 to the 
                                                                                                                     
* Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Israel. 
** Brown University. 
*** University of Cologne; University of Limerick. 
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1 Robert Mclean, Turing Cuts Hospital Price for Drug It Hiked 5,000%, CNNMONEY (Nov. 25, 
2015, 8:17 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25/news/companies/turing-pharmaceuticals-
daraprim-price-drop/.   
2 Id. 
3 See ROBERT B. REICH, THE COMMON GOOD 10 (2018) (describing Shkreli’s response to 
criticism of the Daraprim price hike); Richard Mark Kirkner, Drug Pricing Regulation Pushed from 
Many Sides, MANAGED CARE, Jan. 2016, at 14, 15 (noting criticism of Shkreli and Turing by 2016 
presidential candidates and Merck CEO).   
4 See Lisa Cosgrove & Robert Whitaker, Finding Solutions to Institutional Corruption: Lessons 
from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 16–19 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 9, 
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261375 (explaining how relationships 
between doctors and pharmaceutical companies create conflicts of interest and worsen quality of care); 
BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS 316 
(2012) (describing how senior doctors were paid by pharmaceutical companies to promote their drugs, 
changing the prescribing behavior of other doctors). 
5 See Elinor Amit et al., Institutional Corruption Revisited: Exploring Open Questions Within the 
Institutional Corruption Literature, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 447, 453 (2017) (explaining how the 
current United States campaign finance system results in the “donor class” exerting a disproportionate 
political influence); Girish J. Gulati, Super PACs and Financing the 2012 Presidential Election, 49 
SOCIETY 409, 409 (2012) (explaining that the relationship between candidates and donors threatens 
democratic governance and creates opportunities for corruption); Jonathan Mendilow & Michael 
Brogan, Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in Government in the United States, in CORRUPTION AND 
GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 59, 62 (Jonathan Mendilow 
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President of the United States who does not shy away from conflicts of 
interest by maintaining control over his private business while in office.6 
All of these examples have one thing in common: the action is legal yet 
carries negative consequences for the greater good.   
Tension between the legal status of an action and its impact on the 
greater good poses a particular type of challenge when judging its moral 
acceptability. In a democratic society, laws are expected to represent the 
interests of its people, protect the greater good from individual 
misconducts, or at the very least not harm the society. While this is usually 
true, lawmakers cannot foresee each and every incident in which the law 
will be relevant. As a result, some legal behaviors may end up harming the 
greater good. Such legal yet harmful behaviors have been observed in 
research, design, manufacturing, and marketing processes of new products 
and policies released by various institutions.7 For instance, gaming 
companies use legal yet socially irresponsible marketing strategies and 
tactics to target vulnerable populations and encourage gambling.8  
In the farming industry, hog, poultry, and cattle farms often use legal 
antibiotics as a feed additive to stimulate artificial growth in their 
livestock.9 Through overuse, these antibiotics eventually become 
ineffective for bacterial infections, which people often contract through 
meat consumption and drinking infected water.10 As more and more 
antibiotics are becoming ineffective, new, usually more expensive, drugs 
have to be developed, leaving many individuals with no viable methods of 
treatment.11 This is one of many deadly but legal12 practices exercised by 
the farming industry. Big factory farming industries often lobby for 
                                                                                                                     
& Ilan Peleg eds., 2016) (noting that a quid pro quo between donors and politicians is the “most 
flagrant form of political corruption”). 
6 Steve Reilly et al., Did Trump Keep His 19 Promises to Insulate Himself from His Business? 
Only He Knows., USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-
depth/news/politics/2019/03/18/president-donald-trumps-promises-didnt-end-business-
entanglements/3030377002/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2019, 9:08 PM). 
7 See Nikos Passas, Lawful but Awful: ‘Legal corporate crimes’, 34 J. SOCIO-ECON. 771, 777 
(2005) (noting that the activities of several industries generate “hidden costs” that are mainly borne by 
the least privileged); John Warren Kindt, The Costs of Legalized Gambling: An Economic Approach, in 
IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 115, 124 
(Nikos Passas & Neva Goodwin eds., 2004) (explaining how the gambling industry targets lower 
income individuals and encourages excessive gambling by “consistent gamblers”). 
8 June Buchanan et al., The Marketing of Legal but Potentially Harmful Products and Corporate 
Social Responsibility: The Gaming Industry View, 4 INT’L J. INTERDISC. SOC. SCI. 81, 84 (2009). 
9 Mallory Russo, Food for Thought: Analyzing the Impacts of Livestock Factory Farming in the 
United States 40 (May 15, 2017) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Fordham University) (on file with Fordham 
University Libraries); Mark Ritchie, The High Price of Cheap Food, in IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T 
RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 178, 180 (Nikos Passas & Neva 
Goodwin eds., 2010). 
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government regulations and laws that can profit their operations, allowing 
them to sustain inadequate facilities and exploit environmental resources.13 
These actions lead to irreversible consequences such as extinction of 
species, deadly working conditions for workers (e.g., farm workers are 
exposed to harmful chemicals and may die from asphyxiation), land and 
soil degradation, water contamination, and exacerbation or climate 
change.14 While such practices adhere to legal requirements, they bring 
harm of various degrees to society.  
How do people resolve this conflict and judge the moral acceptability 
of legal yet harmful actions? This question is important, because people’s 
moral judgments determine a wide variety of behaviors, from purchasing 
products,15 to protesting against companies,16 to voting for or against 
politicians in public elections.17 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in behaviors which 
are legal yet harm the greater good, collectively labeled as “institutional 
corruption.”18 According to the classic definition by Lessig (2013):   
Institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic 
and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently 
ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by 
diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to 
achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its 
purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution 
or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.19 
A surge of research on institutional corruption in the past decade has 
examined its manifestations in various domains, including: the 
pharmaceutical industry,20 psychiatry,21 food production and distribution 
                                                                                                                     
13 Russo, supra note 9, at 35. 
14 Id. at 16, 43. 
15 See Johannes Brinkmann, Looking at Consumer Behavior in a Moral Perspective, 51 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 129, 129 (2004) (claiming that “business ethics and consumer behavior could profit from 
further development of their overlap”); Oliver M. Freestone & Peter J. McGoldrick, Motivations of the 
Ethical Consumer, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 445, 445 (2008) (discussing the rise of consumer action “in the 
form of boycott activity, pressure groups and other forms of consumer activism”). 
16 Norman E. Bowie & Thomas W. Dunfee, Confronting Morality in Markets, 38 J. BUS. ETHICS 
381, 385, 389 (2002). 
17 See JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING 1–2 (2011) (arguing the moral significance and 
ethical implications of voting). 
18 See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 448 (describing the increased scholarly attention to institutional 
corruption). Lessig provides a definition for institutional corruption in Lawrence Lessig, Foreword: 
“Institutional Corruption” Defined, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 2, 2 (2013).  
19 Lessig, supra note 18, at 553 (emphasis added). 
20 See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over 
doctors); see also Garry C. Gray, The Ethics of Pharmaceutical Research Funding: A Social 
Organization Approach, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 629, 629 (2013) (illustrating the subtle ways 
pharmaceutical industry funding influences medical research); Donald W. Light, From Institutional 
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companies,22 and political campaigns.23 For example, research on the 
pharmaceutical industry has revealed that funding from drug companies 
influences medical researchers to produce favorable reviews of the 
company’s products, thus enabling a significant number of harmful drugs 
to reach the market.24 This undermines pharmaceutical companies’ mission 
of improving patient care and public health and promoting drug safety.25 
Similarly, in the field of psychiatry, financial conflicts of interest have 
compromised biomedical research, teaching, and practice.26 Organizations 
such as the American Psychiatric Association (APA) receive substantial 
funding from the drug industry, and many of the individuals who serve as 
diagnostic panel members have ties with the drug industry.27 “Industry 
financial relationships can . . . affect researchers’ and clinicians’ behavior 
in subtle ways” potentially influencing “decisions about the criteria for and 
measurement of diagnoses.”28 
Institutional corruption has also been observed in political 
campaigns.29 For instance, the creation of super political action committees 
(super PACs) in 2010 sparked significant controversy, as committees were 
allowed to receive and spend unlimited sums of money on independent 
                                                                                                                     
Corruption to Pharmageddon?, 1 LAB DISPATCHES 69, 69–70 (2013) (reviewing David Healy’s 
observation that the FDA and pharmaceutical companies have major influence over the medical 
industry); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for 
Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511 (2012) (“Physician relations with pharmaceutical firms are a 
source of conflicts of interest that can bias their prescriptions and advice.”).  
21 See ROBERT WHITAKER & LISA COSGROVE, PSYCHIATRY UNDER THE INFLUENCE: 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION, SOCIAL INJURY, AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REFORM 4 (2015) (examining 
the societal impacts of the psychiatry field); Lisa Cosgrove & Emily E. Wheeler, Industry’s 
Colonization of Psychiatry: Ethical and Practical Implications of Financial Conflicts of Interest in the 
DSM-5, 23 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 93, 93 (2013) (arguing that modern psychiatry has been captured by 
the pharmaceutical industry); Marc-André Gagnon, Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets: 
Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 571, 
574 (2013) (highlighting how new anti-psychotic drugs dominate the market despite being more 
expensive and less effective than older drugs). 
22 See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 450 (discussing the case of Del Monte Foods); see also Sylvia 
Rowe et al., Funding Food Science and Nutrition Research: Financial Conflicts and Scientific 
Integrity, 67 NUTRITION REVIEWS 264, 264–65 (2009) (describing issues of conflict and scientific bias 
in the food industry); Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: 
Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 119, 142 (2004) (discussing the Food and Drug Administration’s conflict policy). 
23 See sources cited supra note 5; see also Malcolm S. Salter, Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and 
the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector 2, 24 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
11-060, 2010) (describing the scope and size of private money influencing Congress). 
24 See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over 
doctors). 
25 See sources cited supra note 18 (discussing institutional corruption). 
26 Cosgrove & Wheeler, supra note 21, at 94. 
27 Id. at 102. 
28 Id. at 97. 
29 Gulati, supra note 5, at 409. 
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campaigning in support of or in opposition to political candidates.30 
Politicians receiving unlimited anonymous donations from super PACs 
suggested that there could be a disproportionate influence on policy and 
electoral outcomes.31 
Despite its importance, determining which behaviors fall under the 
category of institutional corruption is challenging. Even amongst experts 
there is disagreement over what counts as institutional corruption. In a 
survey we conducted, a set of ten scenarios that represent different facets 
of institutional corruption was presented to members of the Edmond J. 
Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University—all of whom were experts 
on the topic of institutional corruption research. These scenarios covered 
topics that are relevant for the concept of institutional corruption in various 
settings and were selected based on the research of the fellows of the 
center. In this survey, the experts were asked to judge whether the 
scenarios represent institutional corruption. For half of the scenarios we 
presented, 30% of the subjects or more thought that they do not represent 
instances of institutional corruption. The results illustrate the challenge in 
clearly identifying instances of institutional corruption, even by experts. 
The current paper is concerned with how the public morally judge 
instances of institutional corruption. We bring evidence that institutional 
corruption is perceived as more morally acceptable than criminal behavior, 
even when the portrayed action is identical except for its legal status. 
Moreover, although people’s moral judgments are sensitive to information 
about the legal status of the action—what we henceforth deem the 
distinguishing characteristic between institutional corruption and criminal 
action—people are not sensitive to information about the magnitude of the 
harm caused by the action. Thus, cases of institutional corruption with 
horrible consequences are judged as more morally acceptable than criminal 
actions with benign consequences. Together, our research suggests a 
surprising and ironic role for the law: that it diminishes independent, 
critical thinking. While criminal actions that have mildly negative 
consequences can be construed as immoral, institutional corruption will be 
seen as moral despite having terrible consequences. 
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The following experiments were designed to investigate how people 
judge institutional corruption versus criminal actions. Moral scenarios 
were presented, and people judged the moral acceptability of the action of 
a protagonist. We varied whether an action was institutional corruption or 
criminal by manipulating the legal status of the action: for the “institutional 
                                                                                                                     
30 Id. at 410. 
31 Id. at 409. 
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corruption” group the action was presented as legal, and for the “criminal 
behavior” group the action was presented as illegal. All the presented 
actions had a negative impact on the greater good. Additionally, we varied 
the severity of the direct consequences of the actions. Research shows that 
actions with bad consequences are judged as less morally acceptable than 
those with less bad consequences.32 We therefore wanted to rule out the 
possibility that people’s judgments are contingent on a particular outcome.  
A. Experiment 1A 
1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 131 MTurkers (75 females; Mage = 34.06, SD = 
11.15) who participated in exchange for payment. The participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs. 
Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Large) between-subjects design. In this and 
all subsequent studies: (A) we set a sample size based on previous research 
that had used similar methods and stimuli33; (B) our only a-priori selection 
criteria was recruiting subjects residing in the United States; and (C) we 
did not exclude any subject from the analysis. Any gap between the 
number of subjects recruited and reported in the “Participants” section and 
the final analysis are due to incompletion of the questionnaire by subjects 
(less than 0.5% of the recruited subjects in each experiment). 
2. Procedure 
Subjects were asked to read three scenarios that described actions of a 
protagonist. Half of the subjects were informed that this action is legal, and 
the other half that it is illegal. In each of these groups, half of the subjects 
were informed that the action is slightly harmful and the other half that it is 
significantly harmful. After reading each scenario, the subjects were asked 
whether the actions of the protagonist are morally permissible on a scale 
that ranged between 1 (completely impermissible) to 7 (completely 
permissible). The subjects were subsequently asked whether the action of 
the protagonist is legal on a scale that ranged from 1 (completely legal) to 
7 (completely illegal) and how would they rate the impact of the action on 
a scale that ranged from 1 (negligible impact) to 7 (strong impact). Finally, 
in this and all subsequent experiments, subjects were asked several 
demographic questions, including gender, age, whether they live in the 
                                                                                                                     
32 See, e.g., Elinor Amit & Joshua D. Greene, You See, the Ends Don’t Justify the Means: Visual 
Imagery and Moral Judgment, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 861, 861 (2012) (discussing how a consequentialist 
judgment that “favor[s] the greater good” is often deemed to be more morally salient); Jonathan Baron, 
Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 3 (1994). 
33 Elinor Amit, Jonathan Koralnik & Ann-Christin Posten, Mental Imagery of Institutional 
Corruption (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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United States, what is their native language, level of education, income 
(range), whether they support federal regulation, how liberal versus 
conservative they are with regards to economic and social issues, and who 
they voted for in the last election. 
The three scenarios are presented below. In the following scenarios, 
legal actions appear in the text; illegal in parentheses. Big impact appears 
in the text; small impact in parentheses.  
i. Scenario 1 (hospital) 
Suppose there is a head of a hospital network who receives money 
from a pharmaceutical company to give a talk. The head of the network 
then contemplates changing the hospital network’s electronic drug 
prescribing system from prescribing generic drugs as the default to 
prescribing brand name drugs as the default. Changing the default option 
from generic to brand name drugs has been shown to increase the 
percentage of brand name drugs prescribed. While the brand name drug is 
effectively identical to the generic, the brand name costs patients and 
insurance companies more, and earns the drug company more. The hospital 
director decides to change the electronic drug prescribing system to make 
brand name drugs the default. The increase in the percentage of brand 
name drugs prescribed causes patients and insurance companies to pay 
significantly (slightly) more for medications. According to the State 
Medical Board, it is legal for doctors to accept payments from 
pharmaceutical companies of up to $10,000 ($4000). The pharmaceutical 
company paid the doctor $7000.  
ii. Scenario 2 (coal) 
Under the U.S. Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) sets limits on certain pollutants. State governments can choose to 
make the state laws stricter than those of the EPA, though no state can 
have more lenient laws than those of the EPA. Suppose there is a CEO of a 
coal factory who is deciding whether to increase the energy produced by 
the plant. In order to produce energy, the factory burns fossil fuels, which 
emit air pollution into the surrounding towns. Notably, the percentage of 
residents in the closest town that have asthma is significantly (slightly) 
greater than the national average. According to the state law, it is legal for 
the coal factory to emit up to 40,000 (20,000) tons per year. The CEO 
decides to increase the factory’s air pollution emission to approximately 
30,000 tons per year to meet his energy goals. 
iii. Scenario 3 (army) 
Suppose there is a retired army general who serves as a director at a 
defense contractor and also advises the Department of Defense (DoD). As 
a director of a defense contractor, his job is to advocate for the weapons his 
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company produces. However, as an advisor, his job is to help find and 
purchase the most effective weaponry for the United States Army. The 
American military relies on the Department of Defense to choose top 
quality weapons. The general advises the DoD in favor of choosing his 
company’s products and the Department decides to follow his advice. 
Notably, some of the weapons sold by his company may not be the most 
cost-effective choices. Because of the cost of these weapons, the Army will 
have to significantly (slightly) decrease the budgets of other agencies. 
According to federal law, it is legal for DoD advisors to withhold 
information about conflicts of interest on purchases under $30 ($20) 
billion. The general advises the DoD to purchase his weapons from his 
defense contractor for $25 billion. 
3. Analyses and Results 
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with 
legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as factors, and moral 
judgment, legality judgment and impact judgment as dependent measures. 
The results show that the legal status of the action affected moral 
judgments such that actions that were legal were judged to be more 
morally permissible than actions that are illegal (Ms = 3.5 and 2.08, 
respectively); F (1, 127) = 35.38, p < .001, η² = .22. In contrast, the 
severity of the consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment 
(Ms = 2.8 and 2.8, respectively); F (1, 127) = 0.02, p = .877. There was no 
interaction between legality and consequences F (1, 127) = 0.19, p = .663. 
Legal actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.2 
and 6.02, respectively); F (1, 127) = 87.23, p < .001, η² = .4. Legality also 
affected perceived impact: legal actions were perceived to have smaller 
impact than illegal actions (Ms = 5.09 and 4.6, respectively); F (1, 127) = 
3.94, p < .049, η² = .03.  
In order to further explore the results, we investigated whether political 
orientation affects the relative weight people give to legality versus 
morality. Among our 131 subjects, 48 mentioned that in the 2016 
presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 33 for Donald 
Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other names). For the ease 
of interpretation of the effect of political orientation on moral judgments, 
we analyzed only subjects who endorsed Clinton or Trump. The results 
show that legal actions were judged as more morally acceptable than 
illegal actions (Ms = 3.43 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73) = 22.98, p < 
.0001, η² = .23. The rest of the effects were not significant. Thus, political 
orientation did not affect moral judgments nor interact with legality or 
impact. 
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B. Experiment 1B 
1. Overview 
In Experiment 1B, we replicated the procedure of Experiment 1A 
using a different set of scenarios. 
2. Participants and Design 
Participants were 130 MTurkers (79 females; Mage = 36.98, SD = 
11.90) who participated for a payment in the experiment. The participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: 
Legal vs. Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design. 
3. Procedure 
The method of Experiment 1B was identical to that of 1A, with a 
different set of scenarios. The scenarios used in this experiment appear 
below. In the following scenarios legal actions appear in the text; illegal in 
parentheses. Big impact appears in the text; small impact in parentheses.  
i. Scenario 1 (CEO) 
Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide 
whether to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is 
often used in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is 
cost-effective; using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The 
CEO decides to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA 
consumption is significantly (slightly) correlated with an increased health 
risk of headaches and nausea. According to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), it is legal to sell foods containing up to 2 mg (1.5 
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg 
of ABA.  
ii. Scenario 2 (scientist) 
Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs 
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine. 
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and 
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also 
reveal a significant (slight) correlation between using this drug and 
experiencing various side effects, such as increased blood pressure. The 
scientist decides to re-run the studies that had the best results. These results 
confirm the positive findings from before. The scientist only publishes the 
positive results in the medical literature. The FDA approves the drug. 
According to the FDA, it is legal for scientists investigating the safety of 
prescription drugs to exclude up to 30% (20%) of their results. The 
scientist excluded 25% of their results.  
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iii. Scenario 3 (prison) 
Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to 
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when 
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it 
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison 
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison. 
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support 
system of family and friends leads to a significant (slight) increase in their 
rates of recidivism. According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons 
to transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to 
send some to prisons up to 150 miles away.  
4. Analyses and Results 
As in Experiment 1A, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as 
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as 
dependent measures. The results show that the legal status of the action 
affected moral judgments such that legal actions were perceived as more 
morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.48 and 1.76, respectively); 
F (1, 126) = 50.91, p < .001, η² = .29. In contrast, the severity of the 
consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment (Ms = 2.53 and 
2.71, respectively); F (1, 126) = 0.60, p = .44. There was no interaction 
between legality and consequences F (1, 126) = 0.38, p = .54. Legality 
affected perceived legality, such that legal actions were perceived as more 
legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.19 and 6.22, respectively); F (1, 126) = 
93.2, p < .0001, η² = .42. No other effect was significant.  
As in Experiment 1A, in order to further explore the results, we 
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people 
give to legality versus morality. Among our 130 subjects, 58 mentioned 
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 
29 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other 
names). As in Experiment 1A, we analyzed only subjects who endorsed 
Clinton or Trump. The results show that legal actions were judged as more 
morally acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 4.02 and 1.79, respectively); 
F (1, 79) = 57.14, p < .0001, η² = .42. Subjects who endorsed Clinton 
judged the behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed 
Trump (Ms = 2.54 and 3.28, respectively); F (1, 79) = 6.36, p < .014, η² 
=.075. We also found a significant interaction between voting and 
outcomes. For Clinton voters, when the outcome was small, the behavior 
was judged as more morally acceptable than when the outcome was large 
(Ms = 3.09 and 1.98, respectively, p < .001). For Trump voters, there was 
no significant difference between small and large outcomes (Ms = 1.18 and 
3.38, respectively, p < .68). The rest of the effects were not significant. 
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C. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we used the same basic design of Experiment 1, and 
manipulated legality (legal, illegal) and impact (big, small). The main 
difference was that in Experiment 2 we described impacts as distinct 
outcomes (e.g., diabetes versus skin rash).  
1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 132 MTurkers (85 females; Mage = 36.75, SD = 
12.10) who were paid for participation. The participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs. Illegal) x 
2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design.  
2. Procedure 
The method of Experiment 2 was identical to that of 1B, except that 
impact was described as distinct outcomes. In the following scenarios legal 
actions appear in the text; illegal actions appear in parentheses. Big impact 
appears in the text; small impact appears in parentheses.  
i. Scenario 1 (CEO) 
Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide whether 
to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is often used 
in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is cost-effective; 
using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The CEO decides 
to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA consumption is 
correlated with an increased health risk of diabetes (skin rashes). 
According to the FDA, it is legal to sell food containing up to 2 mg (1.5 
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg 
of ABA.  
ii. Scenario 2 (scientist) 
Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs 
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine. 
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and 
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also 
reveal a correlation between using this drug and experiencing side effects 
such as irregular heart rhythms (headaches). The scientist decides to re-run 
the studies that had the best results. These results confirm the positive 
findings from before. The scientist only publishes the positive results in the 
medical literature. The FDA approves the drug. According to the FDA, it is 
legal for scientists investigating the safety of prescription drugs to exclude 
up to 30% (20%) of their results. The scientist excluded 25% of their 
results.  
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iii. Scenario 3 (prison) 
Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to 
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when 
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it 
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison 
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison. 
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support 
system of family and friends leads to an increase in the rate of prisoners 
returning to committing felonies such as burglaries (misdemeanors such as 
shoplifting). According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons to 
transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to send 
some to prisons up to 150 miles away.  
3. Analyses and Results 
As in Experiment 1, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as 
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as 
dependent measures. The results show that subjects used only legality to 
determine the moral permissibility of the actions, such that they judged 
legal actions to be more morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.1 
and 1.69, respectively); F (1, 128) = 44.04, p < .001, η² = .26. There was 
no effect of consequences (Ms = 2.39 and 2.48), F (1, 128) = 0.13, p = 
.715, and impact did not interact with legality, F (1, 128) = 0.07, p = .932. 
Legality affected the perceived legality of the action, such that legal 
actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.08 and 
6.23, respectively); F (1, 128) = 98.42, p < .001, η² = .43. Finally, when 
asked about the severity of consequences, subjects estimated illegal actions 
to be more severe than legal actions (Ms = 5.58 and 4.82, respectively); F 
(1, 128) = 8.76, p = .004, η² = .06. Unlike the pretest, here, where subjects 
were given information about legality, the consequences did not affect the 
judged severity of 10 consequences, F (1, 128) = 0.32, p = .58, nor was 
there an interaction, F (1, 128) = 0.44, p = .51. 
As in Experiment 1, in order to further explore the results, we 
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people 
give to legality versus morality. Among our 132 subjects, 45 mentioned 
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 
36 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other 
names). The results show that legal actions were judged as more morally 
acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 3.41 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73) 
= 26.16, p < .0001, η² = .26. Subjects who endorsed Clinton judged the 
behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed Trump (Ms 
= 3.01 and 2.29, respectively); F (1, 73) = 5.91, p < .018, η² = .075. The 
remaining effects were not significant. 
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Figure 1. People rely on legality when judging moral permissibility of 
actions. Subjects judged the moral permissibility of actions that are either 
legal or illegal. In Experiment 1a (Fig 1A) and 1b (Fig 1B), the impact of 
the action was defined as having “slightly” or “significantly” negative 
consequences. In Experiment 2 (Fig 1C) the impact was manipulated as 
different outcomes that a pretest showed were considered severe or not 
(e.g., diabetes vs. skin rashes). In all experiments, subjects judged the legal 
actions as more morally permissible than the illegal actions, suggesting 
outsourcing of moral judgment to the Community of Knowledge.
II. GENERAL DISCUSSION: THE LAW AS A SHORTCUT FOR MORAL 
JUDGMENT
The current research shows that people judge institutional corruption 
as more morally acceptable than criminal actions, even when the portrayed 
events are identical. Moreover, our data suggest that the severity of 
outcomes of the portrayed action does not play a role in people’s 
judgments. Thus, institutionally corrupt actions were judged as more 
acceptable than criminal actions, regardless of whether the action had 
severe or benign consequences. Finally, we observed that political 
orientation (operationalized as voting for Trump or Clinton in the 2016 
presidential elections) did not affect the relative weight of legality and 
outcomes, nor did it diminish any of those effects. 
Why is institutional corruption judged as more morally acceptable than 
criminal actions? One explanation for our findings is that people use the 
law as a shortcut to judge whether an action is morally right or wrong. 
Evaluating the morality of actions is not easy. Moral judgments of real-life 
events involve numerous considerations, including the intentions and 
beliefs of actors, outcomes of actions,34 protected values,35 and one’s 
emotional reactions.36
                                                                                                                    
34 Amit & Greene, supra note 32, at 861; see Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton, 
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Research from cognitive science and psychology suggest that, when 
faced with complex assessment tasks, people use simplifying strategies to 
make decisions.37 It is therefore possible that when it comes to moral 
judgments, one simplifying strategy that people adopt is to not consider the 
moral dilemma at all. Instead, they outsource the question to the law.38 
According to this logic, the law does not simply reflect people’s sense of 
corruption, but actually determines it. This means that framing actions in 
terms of their legality is more than just a signal of the actions’ morality; the 
framing shapes their morality. 
An appeal to the law is an appeal to the moral reasoning of a 
community of thought leaders (such as legislators and policy makers) who 
have determined the legality of a class of actions that includes the one 
under consideration. Outsourcing cognitive tasks to the community is 
necessary when problems are too complex for individual reasoning alone. 
The many factors that are taken into account when judging moral 
dilemmas, including inferences about intentions, outcomes,39 the need to 
                                                                                                                     
Moral Learning: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives, 167 COGNITION 1, 3 (2017) 
(discussing the role empathy plays in moral responses to outcomes of actions); Liane Young & 
Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of Belief Encoding and Integration in Moral Judgment, 40 
NEUROIMAGE 1912, 1913 (2008) (discussing how children base their moral judgments primarily on an 
action’s consequence). 
35 See Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1 (1997) (defining protected values as those that resist trade-offs with other 
values, particularly economic values); Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and 
Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320–21 (2003) (discussing how moral outrage may 
be triggered by discovering that community members have compromised sacred values). 
36 See Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106 (2001) (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional processing 
to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect people’s 
judgments.”); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach 
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (discussing how, under a social intuitionist 
model, “moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”). 
37 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution 
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 81 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (“The substitution of one question for another, the representation of 
categories by prototypes, the view of erroneous intuitions are easy to override but almost impossible to 
eradicate . . . . We show here that the same ideas apply to a diverse class of difficult judgments . . . .”); 
JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 2 (1993) (“When faced with more complex 
choice problems involving many alternatives, people often adopt simplifying (heuristic) strategies that 
are much more selective in the use of information.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: 
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973) (“We 
propose that when faced with the difficult task of judging probability or frequency, people employ a 
limited number of heuristics which reduce these judgments to simpler ones.”). 
38 See MASS. INST. TECH., HANDBOOK OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE (Thomas W. Malone & 
Michael S. Bernstein eds., 2015). 
39 See Cushman et al., supra note 34, at 3 (discussing the ways in which learning the outcomes of 
their actions affects children’s future decisions); Young & Saxe, supra note 34, at 1913 (“Even though 
they can represent beliefs, these children continue to base their moral judgments primarily on the 
action’s consequences. . . .”). 
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protect sacred values,40 and the need to integrate emotional reactions to 
events,41 make them complex enough to be strong candidates for 
outsourcing. For example, an assessment of big pharma’s culpability for 
aggressively selling opioids requires an analysis of the various companies’ 
prior knowledge and goals when selling opioids, the extent of their 
responsibility for the multiple traumatic consequences of the opioid crisis, 
as well as the amount of suffering that was reduced by the administration 
of opioids, and this must be weighed against each of one’s basic moral 
values while controlling one’s sense of outrage. 
There are alternative explanations for our results. One is that people 
hold the law in such high esteem that breaking the law is itself morally 
wrong and hence illegal actions are by definition immoral. To the extent 
the law is a set of rules that serves to protect people and their rights, it 
should play a substantial role in maintaining an ordered society, and an act 
that breaks the law should be viewed as inherently immoral. This may be, 
but it does not explain why consequences had no influence on judgment. 
Presumably consequences should be an additional contributor to our 
assessments of an act’s morality. Another alternative explanation is that 
legality is easier to evaluate than consequences42 because it is binary (legal 
versus illegal) whereas consequences are complex. This is possible 
although the consequences in our scenarios were not really complex and 
the differences between the bad and very bad consequences were actually 
quite stark. It is also possible that legality is more salient than 
consequences. This seems unlikely and does not explain why consequences 
had no effect whatsoever. If it is a matter of salience, one would expect a 
less salient dimension to have a smaller effect, but not no effect. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, these data show that people judge institutional corruption as 
more morally acceptable than criminal actions. Two otherwise identical 
actions were given different moral appraisals by virtue of their legal status. 
Actions that carry severely negative consequences may pass in the public 
                                                                                                                     
40 See Baron & Spranca, supra note 35, at 1 (defining protected values as those that resist 
trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values); Tetlock, supra note 35, at 320–21 
(discussing how moral outrage may be triggered by discovering that community members have 
compromised sacred values). 
41 See Greene et al., supra note 36, at 2106 (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional 
processing to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect 
people’s judgments.”); Haidt, supra note 36, at 814 (discussing how, under a social intuitionist model, 
“moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”). 
42 See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference 
Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 249 (1996) (discussing the way in which individuals will choose one 
decision-making process over another because it is easier). 
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as morally acceptable if they are legal, while criminal actions with 
relatively minor consequences may be perceived as morally unacceptable.  
Regardless of the explanation for the effect of legality and the neglect 
of consequences for judgments of morality, the results suggest that people 
rely on the law not only to prescribe and prohibit actions, but to actually 
determine their sense of what is moral. In other words, the law not only 
shapes how people act, but it also shapes what they believe. These findings 
have implications for both legislation and how we assess our society and 
institutions.  
With regard to legislation, lawmakers can take advantage of our 
findings by using them as justification to use the law to nudge people in 
socially beneficial ways, such as discouraging people from smoking in 
public spaces, protecting endangered species, and pushing people to avoid 
sugary drinks. As makers of the law—and consequently, shapers of 
morality—lawmakers have the power to redefine the relationship between 
institutions and people who are affected both directly and indirectly by 
those institutions. Through legislative measures, institutional behavior can 
be restructured, both internally (e.g., eliminating conflicts of interest, 
restructuring guidelines followed by the institution) and externally (e.g., 
evaluating the impact on the greater good).  
But the findings also suggest that we should be aware that our 
evaluations of existing institutional actions may be influenced in ways that 
we are not entirely aware of. Laws may carry information about whether 
actions are morally acceptable or not, but laws may reflect values that are 
out-of-date, they may have been inspired by technology or other facts that 
are no longer relevant, and they may be influenced by political and 
economic interests. In other words, there are a variety of reasons to be 
skeptical of the information carried by current law. Thus, it is important to 
have an independent means to judge the morality of action, not to rely only 
on the law as it is written. The foreseen consequences of an action seem a 
worthwhile basis for such judgment. Without considering such 
consequences, the legal status quo will sustain itself without adequate 
rationale. Pharmaceutical companies will continue to gouge innocent 
victims and politicians will continue to bend the law in favor of themselves 
and their supporters. 
Our findings thus provide additional reason to critically evaluate both 
the law and the morality of our institutions. We need to evaluate the 
consequences of the products we purchase and the policies and politicians 
we support. Society cannot rely only on existing law to make moral 
assessments; it needs to constantly refresh its justifications for the actions 
it considers right and wrong. 
